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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FOURTH DEPARTMENT
1

People v. Taylor
(decided May 3, 2002)
Theodore L. Taylor was arrested and indicted for a
violation of a municipal open container ordinance 2 in the presence
of the arresting officer. 3 A subsequent search of Taylor revealed a
crack pipe in his shirt pocket, and a strip search at the station house
revealed several bags of cocaine in his pants. 4 Taylor moved to
suppress the evidence seized from him after the arrest, claiming
that the search was unreasonable in light of the constitutional
safeguards afforded by the search and seizure clauses embedded in
the Federal 5 and New York State6 Constitutions.7 The Steuben
County Court granted Taylor's motion to suppress the physical
evidence and the State appealed.8 The lower court determined that
the police were not permitted to conduct a full body search of
Taylor without some other behavior which would, give rise to
suspicion that other illegal activity had occurred. 9 The Appellate
Division, Fourth Department unanimously reversed the decision of
the lower court and held that Taylor's arrest for the municipal open
container violation did not prohibit the seizure of the crack pipe,
and Taylor's movement of his0 legs and torso created a reasonable
suspicion to strip search him.1

294 A.D.2d 825, 741 N.Y.S.2d 822 (4th Dep't 2002).
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 2002) states in pertinent part:

2 N.Y.

"Subject to the provisions of subdivision two, a police officer may arrest a
person for: Any offense when he has reasonable cause to believe that such
.
person has committed such offense in his presence ...
3 Taylor, 294 A.D.2d at 825, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
4id.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated... but upon probable cause . ..."
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people
to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...but upon probable cause ......
7 Taylor, 294 A.D.2d at 825, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
8
Id.
9Id.
'0 d. at 826-27.
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The facts of the case are as follows: A police officer for
the City of Homell approached Taylor who was standing on the
sidewalk carrying an open can of beer." The officer asked the
defendant for his name and identification.1 2 Because the defendant
could not provide any identification, the police officer placed the
defendant under arrest, pursuant to the policy of the City of
Hornell Police Department.' 3 The officer sought to obtain prearraignment bail rather than issue an appearance ticket in
accordance with New York's Criminal Procedure Law Sections
150.20 and 150.30.14 After the officer advised the defendant that
he was under arrest and placed him in handcuffs, the officer
noticed a "tubular object" in the defendant's shirt pocket. 5 The
officer removed the object from the defendant's shirt pocket and
identified it as a crack pipe. 16 As the officer was on bicycle patrol,
he called for assistance and then became suspicious when he
observed the defendant's movements of his legs and torso. 7
Taylor was then transported to the police station and subjected to a
strip search by the arresting officer who found eight small bags of
rock cocaine in the pocket of the defendant's pants.18
On appeal to the appellate court, the prosecution argued
that the county court erred in disallowing the crack pipe and
cocaine into evidence because the subsequent search and seizure
" Id. at 826.
12 Taylor, 294 A.D.2d at 826, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
13

id.

14N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 150.20(1) (McKinney 2002) states -in pertinent
part: "Whenever a police officer is authorized pursuant to section 140.10 to

arrest a person without a warrant for an offense other than a class A, B, C or
D felony... he may, subject to the provisions of subdivisions three and four of

section 150.40, instead issue to and serve upon such person an appearance
ticket"; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 150.20(2)(a) (McKinney 2002) states, inter

alia:

"The issuance and service of an appearance ticket under such

circumstances may be conditioned upon a deposit of pre-arraignment bail, as
provided in section 150.30"; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 150.30 (1) (McKinney

2002) states: "Issuance and service of an appearance ticket by a police officer
following an arrest without a warrant, as prescribed in subdivision two of
section 150.20, may be made conditional upon the posting of a sum of money,
known as pre-arraignment bail."
165sTaylor, 294 A.D.2d at 826, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 823.

id.

7

1 id.
18 Id.
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was reasonable as incident to the arrest. 19 The Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, unanimously agreed, reversed the lower
defendant's suppression motion,
court's order on the law, denied
20
indictment.
the
reinstated
and
The appellate court concluded that the full search of the
defendant conducted as a result of the arrest for the municipal open
container violation was authorized and did not violate his fights
2
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 221
The Court began its analysis with United States v. Robinson,
which articulates the traditional exception to the warrant
requirement of the United States Constitution. In Robinson, the
court held that a full body search incident to a person's arrest is
authorized to seize evidence
permissible, and an officer is further
23
found as fruits of criminal conduct.
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the New York State
Constitution provide that the "right of people to be secure in their
persons... against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
,,24 Albeit, the Taylor court recognized that the New
violated.
York Court of Appeals determined that there are some limits on
Constitution that are not
searches inherent in the New York State
25
imposed by the Federal Constitution.
In Robinson, a police officer directed Robinson to stop his
vehicle because he had determined four days earlier that Robinson
was unlawfully operating the motor vehicle with a revoked
operator's permit. 26 It was not disputed that the officer had
probable cause to arrest the defendant and place him into
custody. 27 As the officer performed a pat down search of the
defendant, he felt an object in the left breast pocket of the
defendant's coat.28 After reaching into Robinson's pocket to
'9Id. at 825, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 823.

20 Taylor, 294 A.D.2d at 827, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
21Id. at 826, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
22414 U.S. 218 (1973).
23 Id. at 236-37. 24 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
25 Taylor, 294 A.D.2d at 824, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
26 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220.
27 Id.
at 220-21.

28 Id. at 222-23.
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remove the object, the officer discovered a crumpled pack of
cigarettes that contained items the officer realized were not
cigarettes. 29 Upon further inspection of the cigarette pack, the
officer discovered fourteen gel capsules of white powder which
Robinson was convicted for possession and
was heroin.
facilitation of concealment of heroin. 3 1 However, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the defendant's
conviction and held that the heroin was obtained as a result of a
search of the defendant's person which violated the Fourth
Amendment. 32 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals and held that a full body search that was incident
to the defendant's arrest was permissible. 33 The officer was further
of cigarettes and seize the heroin
authorized to inspect the package
34
conduct.
criminal
of
as fruits
In Robinson, the Court noted, "[t]he search of respondent's
person conducted by Officer Jenks in this case and the seizure
from him of the heroin, were permissible under established Fourth
Amendment Law." 35 Once a lawful custodial arrest is made, a
more extensive exploration of the person is clearly authorized, not
only to protect the officer, but to preserve evidence as well.36
Further, the fact that the individual was arrested for a driving
offense does not limit the officer's authority to search the
individual. 37 Additionally, it is irrelevant that the officer did not
believe he was in imminent danger, or that he did not suspect the
a weapon, because the custodial arrest had
defendant possessed
38
already been made.
29

Id.at 223.

30

id.

31Robinson, 414 U.S. at 219.
32 Id. at 219-20 (holding that because no further evidence of the crime for
operating a vehicle with a revoked license could be found in a search of the
defendant, the Court of Appeals held that only a search for weapons was
justifiable).
31 Id. at 236-37.
14 Id. at 236.
35 Id.

Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234; id. at 224 ("It is well settled that a search
incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.")
"' Id. at 234.
38 Id. at 236.
36
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On the same day Robinson was decided, the Supreme Court
also decided Gustafson v. Florida,39 and held that an arrest for a
minor traffic offense, to wit, operating a motor vehicle without a
valid driver's license in his possession, entitles the officer to
conduct a full search of the defendant's person incident to the
custodial arrest. 40 The search was held lawful even though the
officer had no subjective fear for his safety or a suspicion that the
defendant was armed. 4 1 The Court further held that the officer was
justified in inspecting a package of cigarettes revealed in the
course of his search, and was entitled to seize the
marijuana
42
conduct.
criminal
of
fruits
as
contained in the package
With respect to the state law claim, the appellate court in
Taylor concluded that the search and seizure of the defendant,
conducted as a result of the defendant's arrest for the municipal
open container violation, did not violate the defendant's rights
43
under Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution.
The Taylor Court cited to People v. Marsh,4 4 which limits the
authority of an officer to conduct a search under the New York
State Constitution. In Marsh, the issue was whether a search of the
person is constitutionally authorized as incident to a custodial
arrest for a minor traffic violation. A warrant was issued for the
defendant in 1965 for speeding, a minor traffic violation
committed in 1963. 45 When the defendant was arrested and placed
under arrest, a search of the defendant's pocket revealed a
matchbook that, when opened, indicated to the police officer that
the defendant was engaged in the playing of policy, 46 prohibited
'9 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
40 id. at 260.
41 Id. at 266.
42 id.

Taylor, 294 A.D.2d at 826, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 822 (citing People v. Welch,
289 A.D.2d 936, 734 N.Y.S.2d 768 (4th Dep't 2001); People v. Glasgow, 272
43

A.D.2d 914, 708 N.Y.S.2d 668 (4th Dep't 2000); People v. Barclay, 201 A.D.2d
952, 607 N.Y.S.2d 531 (4th Dep't 1994)).
" 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967).
41 Id. at 100, 228 N.E.2d at 785, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
46N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney 2002) § 225.10 defines "policy" as follows:
'Policy' or the numbers game, means a form of lottery in
which the winning chances or plays are not determined upon
the basis of a drawing or other act on the part of persons
conducting or connected with the scheme, but upon the basis
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under New York's Penal Law Section 225. 47 The defendant
challenged the denial of his suppression motion on both federal
and state constitutional search and seizure grounds. The court
subsequently held, "no search for a weapon is authorized as
incident to an arrest for a traffic infraction, regardless of whether
the arrest is made on the scene or pursuant to a warrant, unless the
officer has reason to fear an assault or probable cause for believing
that his prisoner has committed a crime. ' '48 Accordingly, the
defendant's conviction was reversed and the motion to suppress
was granted. 49 The court discussed of the legislative intent and
reasoned that arrests made in conjunction with minor traffic
violations do not grant permission to an officer to conduct a search
of the person.5 0 Such a search would be permissible only in
circumstances where the officer reasonably suspects that he is in
imminent danger because the defendant possesses a weapon, or the
probability exists that the defendant possesses evidence of a crime
greater than a traffic infraction. 5 1 Further, the court found it
irrelevant that the defendant was initially issued a summons and
his subsequent arrest warrant was issued as a result of his failure to
appear. 52 The dissent in Marsh argued that taking a defendant into
custody under an arrest for a traffic infraction is the same as taking
a defendant into custody under an arrest for a felony, and wrote "it
would be unnecessary and perhaps hazardous to deny a police
officer the right to search when a defendant is being taken into
custody ....
However, the majority opinion is the current state
of the law with respect to searches that accompany arrests for
minor traffic violations in the State of New York.
of the outcome or outcomes of a future contingent event or
events otherwise unrelated to the particular scheme.
Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d at 100, 228 N.E.2d at 785, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 791.

Id. at 102, 228 N.E.2d at 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
Id. at 103, 228 N.E.2d at 787, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
0
' Id. at 101, 228 N.E.2d at 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
48

49

51 Id.

Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d at 102, 228 N.E.2d at 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 793. ("The
warrant does no more than authorize the police officer to make an arrest for an
offense which he did not witness. It does not give him any greater power to
52

conduct a search than he would have possessed had he actually seen the
infraction and thereupon stopped the offender.").
" Id. at 103, 228 N.E.2d at 787, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (Scileppi, J., dissenting).
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The Taylor Court further relied on People v. Troiano.54 In
Troiano, the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended
or revoked license pursuant to a warrant issued six days earlier.55
As opposed to a minor traffic infraction, aggravated
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in New York State is a
misdemeanor.56 After the officer placed the defendant under arrest
and conducted a pat down search, he recovered a loaded revolver
in the waistband of the defendant's pants. 57 The defendant claimed
that the search of his person was not authorized for an arrest
pursuant to a traffic violation, and as such, the revolver should
have been suppressed. 8 In affirming the order of the appellate
court, the Court of Appeals stated, "[s]o long as the person is being
taken into custody, he has lost whatever interest in privacy he had
before the arrest, the taking into custody itself being the grossest
intrusion upon his privacy." 59 Accordingly, the court held, "so
long as the arrest is lawful, the consequent exposure to search is
inevitable."60 Furthermore, the concurring opinion agreed with the
rationale in Robinson, in that this defendant's federal constitutional
rights had not been violated. 6 '

35 N.Y.2d 476, 323 N.E.2d 183, 363 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1974).
" Id. at 477, 323 N.E.2d at 184, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
56 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 511(1)(b) (McKinney 2002)
14

which states:
[A] person is guilty of the offense of aggravated unlicensed
operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree when such
person operates a motor vehicle upon a public highway while
knowing or having reason to know that such person's license
or privilege of operating such motor vehicle in this state or
privilege of obtaining a license to operate such motor vehicle
issued by the commissioner is suspended, revoked or
otherwise withdrawn by the 'commissioner.
When a person is convicted of this offense, the sentence of the
court must be: (i) a fine of not less than two hundred dollars
nor more than five hundred dollars; or (ii) a term of
imprisonment of not more than thirty days; or (iii) both such
fine and imprisonment."
" Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d 477, 323 N.E.2d at 184, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
Id. at 477-78, 323 N.E.2d at 184, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
I8
'9Id. at 478, 323 N.E.2d at 184, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 944 (citations omitted).
60 Id. at 478, 323 N.E.2d at 185, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
61 Id. at 479, 323 N.E.2d at 185, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 946-7 (Rabin, J., concurring).
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The concurring decision in Troiano noted that New York
State's Constitution provides no authority for a search incident to
an arrest for an "infraction," as opposed to an arrest for a
misdemeanor or felony charge, absent a reason for the officer to
fear for his own safety or upon probable cause that the arrestee has
committed a crime. 62 Whereas, the United States Supreme Court
later held in People v. Robinson,6 3 that a full search of the person
incident to any lawful custodial arrest "is not only an exception to
but is also a
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
'reasonable' search under that Amendment." 64
Despite these differences between the Federal and State
Constitutions, the Taylor court relied on People v. Weintraub,65
and reasoned that while the authority to search incident to a lawful
custodial arrest is predicated upon the need to protect the officer's
safety or preserve evidence, an officer need not later justify a
concern for his own safety nor that there was a probability that he
would find instrumentalities of a crime when he initiated the
search.66
The majority in Marsh expressly stated that an exception to
permitting a search incident to an arrest for a traffic violation is the
reasonableness that the officer feared for his safety and that he had
probable cause to believe that the offender possessed further
67
evidence of a crime.

62

Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d at 479-80, 323 N.E.2d at 186, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 948-49

(Rabin, J., concurring) (citing People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783,
281
63 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967)).
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.
64 Id. at 235.
N.Y.2d 351,320 N.E.2d 636, 361 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1974).
65
66 Taylor, 294 A.D.2d at 826, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 822. See People v. Weintraub,
35 N.Y.2d 351, 353-54, 320 N.E.2d 636, 638, 361 N.Y.S.2d 897, 897 (1974)
("The lawful custodial arrest being a constitutionally reasonable intrusion upon
the defendant's privacy, the search incident requires no additional
justification."); see also People v. Barclay, 201 A.D.2d 952, 952, 607 N.Y.S.2d
531, 532 (1994) ("[D]efendant Barclay was lawfully arrested for exposure of a
person, a violation, which was committed in the officer's presence. The search
of Barclay was thus authorized as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Such a
search is proper without regard to whether the officer fears that the suspect may
be armed.") (citations omitted).
67 Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d at 102, 228 N.E.2d at 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
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The Supreme Court of the State of New York has also
recognized the stricter standard afforded under the New York State
Constitution in the recent case of People v. Henry.6 8 In Henry, the
defendant was arrested for a minor traffic violation and a
subsequent search revealed wire pliers, identified as a burglar's
tool. 69 The court, in holding that the seizure of the wire pliers from
the defendant's person was permissible as incident to the custodial
arrest, outlined the exceptions laid out in Troiano as follows:
The general rule [under New York State
constitutional law] is that in traffic violation arrests
the search incident to a lawful arrest exception
cannot be used to justify a frisk:
where the
conclusion that the defendant may be armed cannot
be justified; where there is an alternative to
custodial arrest such as a summons;
or 'because the
70
arrest was a suspect pretext.'
In conclusion, after the decision in United States v.
Robinson, federal and New York State law are no longer identical
with respect to their treatment of both their respective search and
seizure clauses. As interpreted by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Robinson, and the New York Court of Appeals in
Troiano, the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a full search
incident to a lawful custodial arrest in order to protect the officer's
safety and to preserve evidence. 7 ' In Marsh, the New York Court
61

181 Misc. 2d 689, 694, 695 N.Y.S.2d 892, 896 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens

County
1999).
69
Id. at 691, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
70 Id. at 694, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (citing People v. Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d at 478,
323 N.E.2d at 185, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 945 (1974)). The court noted that under
federal constitutional law, the search would be valid and proper as incident to an
arrest even for a minor traffic violation. Id. at 694 n.2, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 896 n.2
(citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). But see People v.
Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 346, 767 N.E.2d 638, 640, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 149

(2001) (holding that a traffic stop by an officer who has probable cause to
believe a motorist has committed a traffic infraction does not violate New York
State's Constitution, even if officer's primary motivation is to conduct another
investigation, adopting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) as a matter
of state law).

Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236; see also People v. Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d at 483,
323 N.E.2d at 188, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 1014-15 (1974) (Rabin, J., concurring).
71
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of Appeals adopted the standard, as a matter of state law, that the
only exception to prohibiting a search incident to an arrest for a
traffic violation is when the officer had reason to fear an assault or
had probable cause to believe that the offender possessed further
evidence of a crime.72 The Court of Appeals in Weintraub held
that when conducting a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
the officer need not justify whether he was in imminent fear nor
that he suspected the offender possessed further evidence of a
crime. 73 Therefore, in New York, upon making a lawful arrest for
a minor traffic violation, a police officer may only search the
individual if he reasonably believes he is in danger, or he has
probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a
crime.

Aileen R. Kavanagh

72

Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d at 102, 228 N.E.2d at 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
3 Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d at 353-54, 320 N.E.2d 636, 638, 361 N.Y.S.2d 897,
897.
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